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Article 3

COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE MODERN DANCE
ARRANGEMENT*
Popular tunes are usually published in sheet form, containing a melody line, the chord-progressions (harmony), and a
simple piano adaptation. The work of the modem dance
arranger is to so treat this material as to make it playable by
the orchestra. Ordinarily he will first write a score,1 embodying all the instrumental parts in concert key. Then he
will transpose the individual parts from this score, providing
each musician with a part. When these parts are played by
the musicians, together, the orchestra is playing the arrangement. The arranger usually writes for a particular group of
musicians, and will adapt the parts to their individual capabilities. If the orchestra has a style, his arrangements will be
in that style. Actually, this style is an important identifying
feature of the orchestra. It, and the identity of the leader
are, in most instances, the only permanent parts of the orchestra. Contrary to popular conception, sidemen change
continuously, and a well known orchestra today and the
same orchestra a year from now will probably have little in
common besides the leader and his library of musical arrangements.
*This article received a certificate of award in the Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition of 1947 and is published here with the permission of the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1 Various musical terms which may be unfamiliar to the reader are used in
this paper. A brief definition of some of them may be of value.
Scores: a master sheet on which the parts of all the instruments in the orchestra are written in the same key.
Sidemen: a term used in modem dance orchestra parlance meaning any instrumentalist in the band other than the leader.
Band or orchestra: In modern dance music these terms are used interchangeably, the distinction made in classical music and based upon the instrumentation
being disregarded.
Stock arrangements: These are arrangements published and sold for general
use by dance orchestras. They are to be distinguished from special arrangements,
which are written for one band and are not reproduced for or used by another.
Name bands ordinarily have their own arrangers and employ special arrangements
exclusively.
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The ordinary popular tune is thirty-two bars long. This
will amount, on the average, to about one minute of playing
time-a period too short to be satisfactory for dancing purposes. For this reason it is necessary for the arranger to so
employ the song as to provide a continuous piece of music
of three to five minutes playing time. To accomplish this
the arranger will include two and a half to four choruses of
the song in his arrangement. To avoid monotony and to take
advantage of the resources of the orchestra, he will probably
presenf these different choruses in different ways and with
different instruments carrying the lead. He will perhaps include a vocal chorus with an instrumental background.
Modulations will be necessary to pass from one key to another; a beginning (introduction) and an ending will be provided. In writing for the orchestra, the arranger will not
adhere strictly to the melody and phrasing of the original
song, but will employ rhythmic and melodic alterations to
suit his purpose. In all these respects there is room for originality and musical skill on the part of the arranger. In altering or adding to the original song, he becomes a composer in
his own right, and it is for the protection of these contributions that he is awarded the copyright.
Although dance arrangements have not ordinarily been of
sufficient economic importance to warrant their exploitation
in the past, the growing public recognition of arrangers and
the increasing awareness that here is one of the few uniquely
American art forms will lead to a corresponding appreciation
of dance arrangers as musical creators. This appreciation
will undoubtedly lead, in turn, to the greater economic importance of dance arrangements. The final result may well
be that the hitherto practically ignored arrangement copyright will become of major importance. This paper discusses some of the fundamentals of arrangement copyright
and suggests some already quite practical uses for it.
Common Law Copyright-At the common law, the unpublished works of an author or composer were protected
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against infringement. 2 The author was said to have a property right in his own creation until he dedicated it to the
public or abandoned it. This common law protection is still
available to unpublished works and is the author's only
safeguard for works which are not yet copyrighted. The
question of what constitutes publication so as to amount to
an abandonment of the composer's rights in the composition
is still a troublesome one, in some respects. It is well settled
that public performance of a musical composition is not
abandonment," but that publication of the manuscript is a
dedication to the public and deprives the composer of his
property right in the composition.4 While it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss fully the problem of publication,
certain problems raised by a recent series of cases involving
orchestra leaders and "the distinctive styles created by
them" ' are definitely of interest as affecting arrangements.
In Waring v. WDAS ' BroadcastingStation, a case of first
impression, the question whether an orchestra leader had
the power to limit the use of his recordings was raised. Fred
Waring and His Pennsylvanians had recorded two popular
tunes with the Victor Talking Machine Company. A label
placed upon the records read "Not Licensed for Radio
Broadcasting". The defendant radio station purchased these
records and used them in a broadcast. The copyright owner
of the songs had given the Victor-Talking Machine Company
license to record the songs but not for public performance
for profit. The defendant, however, obtained a license to
broadcast these songs from the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, to whom the publishers had
assigned the exclusive right of public performance under the
copyright. As a result, the publishers were barred from any
2

McCarthy v. White, 259 F. 364 (1919).

8
4
5
6

Ibid.
Ibid.
Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (D. C. E. D. N. C. 1939).
327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
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attack upon defendant. Waring, however, brought suit to
enjoin defendant from broadcasting the records and succeded. In an opinion by Justice Stern of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania the injunction was granted on two grounds:
an enforceable property right in the artistic interpretation,

and unfair competition.

The opinion deserves study and

consideration, if only for the force with which it brings home

to us the need of specially qualified judges in musical copyright cases.
The opinion begins with the false premise that an orchestra such as Waring's lends to a composition the same artistic
type of interpretation as would a classical musician to a
solo.' As we have attempted to point out in the introduction
to this paper, this is not true. The two are completely foreign and are not subject to parallel consideration. Except
for solos in the dance arrangement, which are the artistic
efforts of the soloist, not the orchestra, any artistic interpretation must be attributed, not to the orchestra, but to the
arranger. Seen in this light, the court's comparison of Waring's arrangements and Paderewski's interpretations of
piano compositions is unfortunate."
7 "A number of witnesses, themselves of fame in the musical world, testified,
and the learned chancellor found, that 'Waring's Pennsylvanians' were nationally
and even internationally acclaimed as unique in their artistry. Indeed as already
stated, the fact that they receive from the Ford Motor Company, $13,500 for a
radio performance is striking testimony to the effect." . . . While the major part
of the credit for the work of the orchestra is probably due to plaintiff as conductor . . ." The hopeless mass of misconceptions contained in Justice Stern's
opinion is aptly illustrated by the above quotations.
8 "Does the performer's interpretation of a musical composition constitute a
product of such novel and artistic creation as to invest him with a property right
therein? It may be said that the ordinary musician does nothing more than
render articulate the silent composition of the author. But it must be clear that
such actors as David Garrick, Mrs. Siddons, Rachel, Booth, Coquelin, Sarah Bernhardt, and Sir Henry Irving, or such vocal and instrumental artists as Jenny Lind,
Melba, Caruso, Paderewski, Kreisler and Toscanini, by their interpretations, definitely added something to the works of authors and composers which not only gained
for themselves enduring fame but enabled them to enjoy financial rewards from
the public in recognition of their unique genius; indeed, the large compensation
frequently paid to such artists is testimony in itself of the distinctive and creative
nature of their performance."
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The court then proceeds to the statement that such property rights (rights of performer in his artistic interpretation)
are not the subject of protection under our copyright laws.'
As to Paderewski's renditions this is true, but as to Waring's
arrangements it is false. Such arrangements are copyrightable under our statutes, as will be shown in a succeeding part
of this paper.
Having already convinced itself that Waring had a property right in his orchestra's renditions, and that there was no
adequate protection for this right under existing copyright
laws, both of which statements are incorrect, the court then
considers whether this right has been abandoned by such a
publication as would, under the general American doctrine,
terminate that right. In other words, for the first time in
any court, the question is posed as to whether or not recording an uncopyrighted work for public sale and distribution is
publication. Though the question was posed, it was never
answered. The court preferred to say, in effect, that this did
not matter; that whether or not such a recording amounted
to publication was not the question. The court preferred to
adopt the reasoning that even if recording was a publication,
the affixing of the warning, "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcasting" was, in effect, a condition attached to the publication. The final effect being that Waring's records, even
though published, were published with an accompanying
condition which could validly limit the effect of the publication. This was the first instance of a conditional publication
in the law of copyrights. The court, in discussing the possibility of construing the warning on the record as a valid limi9 "The property rights claimed by plaintiff are admittedly not the subject
of protection under existing copyright laws. The act . . . enumerates the various
literary and artistic productions which may be copyrighted . . . The creator of
such a work may protect his property rights therein, but the statute does not
recognize any right of a performing artist in his interpretive rendition of a musical composition, or in the acting of a play, composed by another. It is to the
common law, therefore, that the performer must turn, and the question arises
whether an actor or musician has any property rights at common law in his
performance."
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tation on the publication, admitted that this had never been
done before but gave as its excuse the reasoning that such
limitations had always been held invalid before as against
public policy.' Here, according to this court, no public policy would be violated by allowing the condition to be effective and for that reason there was no objection to its effectiveness. Thus, the court finally held that Waring had a
property right in his phonograph recordings; that this property right was not the subject of statutory protection under
the copyright laws; and that the publication of an uncopyrighted work could be so limited as to put the work into the
public domain except for a certain class of the public-in
this case radio broadcasters.
Throughout its opinion the court is preoccupied with the
proposition that Waring was without any form of legal protection; a situation which it felt called upon to correct. If
the court had been informed by someone with enough knowledge of music to recognize the difference between an artistic
interpretation and an arrangement such an error could have
been avoided. It is true that there is no protection for the
artistic interpretation, but that is not the question under
consideration here. What was really at issue in this case was
whether or not Waring's arrangements, as distinguished from
artistic interpretations, were published by being recorded.
Such arrangements are certainly copyrightable under our
statutes-a procedure which affords them ample protection.
The opinion might have been more satisfactorily received
also if it had squarely answered the question of whether or
not recording on phonograph records for public use was a
10 "In the present case it is clear that the restriction affixed to the records
'Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast' was not unreasonable, nor did it operate
in restraint of trade. It was intended to effect a legitimate purpose; indeed, unless
such a restriction can be imposed and enforced, it will be impossible for distinguished musicians to commit their renditions to phonograph records--except
probably for a prohibitive financial compensation-without subjecting themselves
to the disadvantages and losses which they would inevitably suffer from the use
of the records for broadcasting. Such a restriction, therefore, works for the encouragement of art and artists."
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publication, instead of conjuring up the idea of a limited
publication to further obscure an already dim legal principle.
That part of the opinion which held that the injunction
would also be awarded on the ground of unfair competition
is not within the scope of this paper.
Waring v. Dunles 11 presents a slightly different situation.
Here Waring made an electrical transcription of a broadcast
program which was supplied to certain network stations to
be broadcast as a network program. It was not offered for
sale to the public and was intended to be used on a single
broadcast by licensed stations on a program known as the
Ford Motor Program. A notice of such restrictions appeared
on the transcription. Respondent, who was not even one of
the licensed distributees of the transcription, used part of it
in one of his broadcasts. Waring brought this suit in equity
for an injunction restraining respondent from further violations of these restrictions. In his opinion, Judge Meekins
adopted, practically in toto, the views of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Waring v. WDAS, including those which
were incorrect. The court speaks again of "artistic interpretations" and limited publications. Logical and harmless as
it might seem to allow the concept of a limited publication to
control in this case, it must be remembered that the result
of allowing it to apply in the case of transcriptions of the"
nature involved in the instant case will necessitate another
rule of law (actually a standard, not a rule) defining the
allowable extent of limitation. Another reason for disallowing the suit is that Waring could have protected these transcriptions in at least two ways, if he had merely taken the
necessary simple steps of copyrighting the arrangements
used or distributing the transcriptions under covenant with
the broadcaster not to use for any purpose other than the one
intended. These cases, as we have attempted to show,
achieve this final result. They conjure up a new legal con11

26 F. Supp. 338 (D. C. E. D. N. C. 1939).
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cept, the limited publication; to correct a misconception,
they consider the artistic interpretation of the orchestra
leader; and for the reason that no remedy exists at law,
which is not correct.
Although this is the law in two jurisdictions, it has fortunately not been accepted elsewhere. A similar case, RCA
Manufacturing Company v. Whiteman,12 arose in the Federal courts in 1940. The Federal District Court for the
Soutltern District of New York adopted the views of the
Pennsylvania court in Waring v. WDAS and granted an injunction on the grounds of property right in the performer's
artistic interpretation and unfair competition. On review,
the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in an opinion
by Justice Learned Hand, reversed the decision on both
grounds and expressly rejected the theories advanced in the
Pennsylvania case. Here the court held that recording a
popular song for public sale and use was publication. In
discarding the idea of a limited publication it was stated,
"Restrictions upon the uses of chattels once absolutely sold
are at least prima face invalid; they must be justified for
some exceptional reason, normally they are repugnant to the
transfer of title". Even here, however, the distinction between an artistic interpretation and an arrangement is not
made. As a result, an easy disposition of the case on well
settled principles is made impossible and the court must deal
with standards instead of rules. The point is this: arrangements of songs can be copyrighted. None of the cases just
discussed ever mention arrangements; instead they begin
with the presumption that the orchestra leader has no statutory protection. In the Waring cases the court attempted to
supply such protection, but in the Whiteman case such judicial legislation was refused. If, in either case, the fact that
the orchestra leader could have provided ample protection
for himself and at the same time validly limited the use of
12

114 F. 2d 86 (C. C. A. 2d 1940); reversing 28 F. Supp. 787.
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his records if he had merely thought to copyright the arrangements had been mentioned, considerable unnecessary
material in these opinions could have been omitted. We
shall further discuss this point in a succeeding section of this
paper entitled "Utility of Copyrighted Arrangements."
Statutory Copyright-An arrangement is entitled to statutory copyright under the laws of the United States," under
certain conditions. If the song to be arranged is copyrighted, the arranger must have the consent of the copyright
owner to use his song in the arrangement. If the song is a
work in the public domain, there is no restriction on its use. 4
In either case, to be entitled to copyright, the arrangement
must contain some original material.
Consent of the Copyright Holder--Section 1, subsection
(e) of the copyright act "5gives the holder of the copyright
on a musical work the exclusive right to make an arrangement. The arranger must, therefore, have the copyright
owner's permission to use his song in an arrangement or the
arrangement will infringe upon the song writer's rights. Usually this permission is easily obtained, since the song writer
will benefit from the publicity his song receives upon being
played by a dance orchestra in public and will retain his
rights in public performance for profit of the composition.
Works in the Public Domain-Since works in the public

domain are not the subject of copyright, no use of them for
arrangements can be an infringement of anyone's right, unless the arrangement is so similar to a previous copyrighted
arrangement as to be a plagiarism of it. Some such cases of
piracy of arrangements have occurred. In Schuberth v.
Shaw 11 Schuberth had made an arrangement of a Waldteufel
Is

Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, § 6; 17 U. S. C. A. § 44.
14 Aronson v. Fleckenstein, 28 F. 75 (C. C. N. D. Ill., 1886); Hoffman v. Le
Traunik, 209 F. 375 (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1913); Carte v. Evans 27 F. 861 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1886).
15 17 U. S. C. A. 44.
16 Fed. Cas. No. 12,482 (C. C. E. D. PA. 1879).
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waltz suite and copyrighted it. Shaw made a close copy of
this arrangement and answered Schuberth's suit for infringement by saying that his (Schuberth's) arrangement was not
an original composition. The court answered, "Labor b6stowed on the production of another is enough to constitute
a claim to copyright, and it is not necessary that complainant be the sole creator of the work for which protection is
claimed." Likewise in Cooper v. James 17 the court protected a collection of hymns arranged for bass, tenor and soprano against a substantial copy, the only alteration being
the addition of an alto part. But if the alleged infringer can
show that the offended arrangement was not entitled to copyright, a subsequent copying is not unlawful.'"
Originality-In order that an arrangement may be entitled to copyright, it must be more than a mere copy. It is
impossible to state exactly what degree of originality is required of the arranger, as the courts themselves are at variance on this subject, and have proposed many varieties of
originality requirements. At one extreme is the statement
that any new, original plan, arrangement or combination of
materials will entitle the author to copyright, unless it be directly copied or evasively imitated from another work.' 9 At
the other extreme is a more recent case,20 which held that
the same test should apply in arrangements as in patents:
that the work must indicate an exercise of inventive genius
as distinguished from mere mechanical skill or change. These
are the extremes; between them we find many degrees of
originality required. A transposition of a foreign song, heretofore unknown in this country, and not copyrighted, is not
properly the subject of copyright. In olle v. Jacques 21 the
17

213 F. 871 (D. C. N. D. Ga. 1914).

18 Joflie v. Jacques, Fed. Cas. No. 7437 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1850).
19 Emerson v. Davies, Fed. Cas. No. 4,436 (C. C. D. Mass. 1845).
Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corporation, 11 F. Supp. 535 (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1935).
21 Fed. Cas. No. 7437 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1850).
20
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court inferred that the'mere fact that a song, the "Roschen
Polka", was introduced into this country by the arranger
would not entitle him to a copyright on his arrangement unless his version was original, and not merely a copy with
minor variations. The question of whether the transposition
of this polka for clarinet would involve sufficient originality
to entitle it to copyright protection was not decided, but it
was inferred that it would not.
In Cooper v. James22 the mere addition to a book of
hymns arranged for tenor, bass and soprano of an alto part
was not considered to be such a new and original work as to
entitle the arranger to copyright protection.
Copying a part of a copyrighted work, or assembling several copyrighted songs in a collection is not, in itself, such an
expression of originality as to amount to a copyrightable arrangement.2" On the other hand, in discussing an operatic
libretto one court held "It is not necessary that a dramatic
work should be entirely original, or original in anything except its arrangement or construction, to make it the proper
subject of private ownership (common law copyright)." 24
An arrangement of the orchestral score of an opera for
piano is an original composition within the meaning of the
copyright law.25 One court has gone so far as to say that
the composition of the piano score from the original operatic
score requires musical skill, if not invention, equal to that
22

213 F. 871 (D. C. N. D. Ga. 1914).
Atwill v. Ferrett, Fed. Cas. No. 640 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1846); Reed v.
Carusi Fed. Cas. No. 11,642 (C. C. D. Md. 1855).
24 Aronson v. Baker, 43 N. J. Eq. (16 Stew.) 365, 12 A. 177 (1887). Other
statements of the originality requirements include the following from Jollie v.
Jacques, op cit. f. n. 18; "The musical composition contemplated by the statute
must, doubtless, be substantially a new and original ;vork; and not a copy of a
piece already produced, with additions and variations, which a writer of music
with ordinary experience and skill might readily make." Atwill v. Ferrett, op. cit.
fn. 23: "An author must produce an arrangement or compilation new in itselfhe may arrange or compile a new production from materials before known, or
obtained for him by the labor of others, but he cannot obtain a copyright for
these materials in the same state in which they were furnished to him."
25 Carte v. Evans, 27 F. 861 (C. C. D. Mass. 1886).
23
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required for the writing of the original opera.2 6 This, of
course, is not true. Schafter, in his book on musical copyright 27 says that this is the most difficult type of arranging.
Such statements are misleading. Transferring the composer's intentions from the grand sweep of an orchestra to
the limited scope of the piano is simply a mechanical process
of simplification, and involves very little, if any, originality.
The reverse process, that of making an orchestral score from
a piano arrangement, is by far the most difficult and musically creative task. This is the work of the modern dance
arranger. He begins with an arrangement for one instrument, with one tone, and passes to the orchestra, consisting
of many instruments, with many varieties of tone and with
infinite possibilities for phrasing and effect. Such work involves originality, by its very nature. The choice of instruments, voicing of chords, composition of backgrounds, introductions, modulations, and the addition of variations in
rhythm and melody are all fields for the arranger's creative
effort.
An adequate discussion of the proper tests of originality
for copyrighting arrangements would occupy more space
than the problem deserves. In the popular music field there
is little possibility that a dance arrangement will fail to prove
amply original and unique. This is so because of the special
character of the music concerned and the demands of orchestra leaders for arrangements containing new, original ideas.
If the arrangement is so stereotyped as to show a lack of the
inventive genius necessary to qualify it for copyright there
is little chance of its having enough value to warrant use of
infringement.
This brings up the interesting question of what, in the arrangement, is copyrighted. Is it the whole arrangement, or is
26

Wood v. Boosey, L. R. 2 Q. B. 340 (

27

SCHAFTER, MusIcAL COPYRIGHT, p. 77

); aff'd L. R. 3 Q. B. 223.
(2d ed. 1939).
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it merely that part of the arrangement which the arranger
has contributed? Section 3 of the Copyright Act 28 says:
The copyright provided by this act shall protect all the copyrightable components of the work copyrighted, and all matter
therein in which copyright is already subsisting, but without
extending the duration or scope of such copyright.

This would seem to indicate that the copyright on an arrangement would extend to the whole work, and not merely
to the arranger's contribution. The cases are at variance on
this subject. In a case involving books, the court raised this

distinction:
It is necessary, however, to keep in mind the distinction between copyrightability and the effect and extent of the copyright so obtained. The degree of protection afforded by the
copyright is measured by what is actually copyrightable in it;
29
that is, by the degree and nature of the original work.

Other cases have, at least impliedly, held exactly the opposite.

In the interesting case of Edmonds v. Stern o the court
held that the originally copyrighted song and a copyrighted
arrangement thereof were entirely distinct and separate. Edmonds wrote the song and copyrighted it, later transferring

the copyright to Stern. Stern then had an arrangement of
the song made, in the form of an orchestral score, which was
also copyrighted. Later Stern transferred the copyright on
the original song back to Edmonds, but retained the copyrighted arrangement and continued to sell it.

Edmonds

brought this action, maintaining that Stern's arrangement
was an infringement upon his copyright in the song. The
court ruled that this was not an infringement, but had to
say, in order to support this conclusion, that the original song
and the copyrighted arrangement were separate and independent compositions, or, to put it differently, that the copy17 U. S. C. A.
American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829 (C. C. A. 2d 1932).
30 248 F. 897 (C. C. A. 2d 1918).
28
29
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right on the arrangement extended to the whole arrangement, and not merely to the original parts introduced by the
arranger.
In the same manner, in Carte v. Evans "1the court held
that the piano arrangement of an orchestral score was substantially a new and distinct composition. Actually, this is
not true in most cases, and it seems much more logical to
limit copyright protection of an arrangement to the part
which is original with the arranger. If the other view is pursued, an infringer upon the original song would be liable to
suit, both by the song writer and the arranger. A sounder
approach would seem to be to estop the song writer from
suing because of his prior consent to the arrangement. Of
course, if the arrangement was made without first obtaining
this consent, the question would not arise.
The Utility of Arrangement Copyright-Granting that
modern dance arrangements are properly the subject of copyright protection, the question arises as to what utility is
served by copyrighting such arrangements. Two rights
granted by the statute to the arranger can be thus protected.
One is the right to prevent or recover for plagiarism or copying. The other is the right to protect against the unauthorized public performance of the arrangement for profit.32
Since dance arrangements are not ordinarily published,
and are usually found only in manuscript form, statutory
copyright could not possibly afford any additional protection
against copying or otherwise plagiarising. The common law
rights of the arranger will give him ample protection in his
unpublished work. In the case of stock arrangements, which
are published for general use by dance orchestras, statutory
copyright is necessary, however, if the arrangement is to be
protected, since the common law rights end upon publication.
31

27 F. 861 (C. C. D. Mass. 1886).
Remick Music Corporation v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Nebraska, 58 F. Supp.
523 (D. C. D. Neb. 1944).
32
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The value of the copyright holder's right solely to perform
his composition publicly for profit may be aptly shown by
examining a series of cases arising in the 1880's. At that
time there were, apparently, no treaty arrangements whereby
a foreign composer could prevent the public performance for
profit of his compositions in this country. In Thomas v.
Lennon,"3 the first of these cases, the court realized the injustice of the situation and protected the composer against
unauthorized public performance of his composition. The
court adopted the reasoning that a book could not publish
what it did not contain, and that the orchestration made
from the published piano and vocal score was an infringement. In the "lolanthe" case 14 the court, in a similar situation, held that such an orchestration was not an infringement
and refused to enjoin performance of the unofficial score.
The defendant was ordered, however, to include in his advertising the information that his was not the original score
of the opera. Finally, in the "Mikado" case " the court refused to enjoin performance of the unauthorized score and
further refused to compel the defendant to advertise that
his was not the composer's score. As long as he did not advertise his orchestration as that of Gilbert and Sullivan, he
was safe in using the score and the dedicated vocal parts and
libretto. Of course, the person damaged in these cases was
not the composer, but the impresario who had purchased the
33 14 F. 849 (C. C. D. Mass. 1883). A book containing the words and vocal
score of Gounod's "Redemption" together with a piano accompaniment with refences in the margin as to the instrumentation was dedicated to the public. Defendant prepared a score based on the published work. Plaintiff, the authorized
holder of performing rights, sought to restrain its use.
84 Carte v. Ford, 15 F. 439 (C.C. D. Md. 1883). Gilbert and Sullivan published a book containing the vocal score of "Iolanthe'l, together with a piano
accompaniment. The defendant paid John Philip Sousa to make an independent
orchestration based on the piano accompaniment. This suit was brought to restrain use of this unauthorized arrangement.
85 Carte v. Duff, 25 F. 183 (C. C. D. N. Y. 1885). Gilbert and Sullivan published the vocal score and libretto of The Mikado and had a United States citizen
prepare a pianoforte arrangement of the orchestral score, which he copyrighted.
The defendant, by using the piano arrangement made an orchestral score from it
and formed his own troupe to compete with the authorized company.
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rights to performance for profit of the works in this country.
Regardless of who was hurt, however, the injustice is clear.
The right to recover for plagiarism or copying is of little
value when it is not accompanied by the sole right to public
performance for profit of a musical work. Here the thing
sought to be protected was the orchestration (arrangement)
provided by the original composer.
It is well settled that a radio broadcast is a public performance for profit. 6 If a broadcaster airs a copyrighted
song without first obtaining permission of the owner of the
performing rights he is guilty of infringement of the copyright. That the alleged infringing performance was of a
phonograph record instead of a live performance made no
difference; the song has still been publicly performed for
profit. 7 An arrangement is entitled to the same protection
as an original composition under our copyright laws,3" and
therefore it follows that the unlicensed broadcast of a copyrighted arrangement, whether by a live orchestra or by a

recording, is an infringement of the arranger's copyright.
The procedure is simple. If the arranger wishes to limit the
use of phonograph records of his arrangement he needs merely to have that arrangement copyrighted. Then he may, in
licensing the use of recordings using his arrangement, limit
their use to whatever extent he wishes. As a practical matter, of course, the arranger will not be concerned with such
36 Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co. 5 F. 2d
411 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925). The extent to which the courts protect the rights to public performance for profit is strikingly shown in the case of Society of European
Stage Authors and Composers v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1 (D.
C. S. D. N. Y. 1937). Here a radio station broadcasted copyrighted musical
compositions with consent of plaintiff, holder of the performing rights. Defendant hotel maintained two master receiving sets connected with the hotel bedrooms
so that the guest could turn on his speaker and select either of two programs.
The court held that the hotel was publicly performing for profit these musical
compositions. For a similar holding see Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. 283
U. S. 191, 51 S. Ct. 410, 75 L. Ed. 971, 76 A. L. R. 1266 (1931).
37 Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debbs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc.
46 F. Supp. 829, Aff'd. 141 F. (2d) 852 (1942).
38 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U. S. C. A.
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things but will sell the arrangement to the orchestra leader,
who will copyright it and then have a most effective means
of control over the use of his recordings, at least in so far
as radio broadcasts are concerned. 9 This enables an orchestra leader to avoid radio competition with his own recordings or to charge a profitable license fee for the privilege
of broadcasting them. Another advantage is that the courts
will no longer feel compelled to extemporize with such meaningless expressions as "protection of the performing artist in
his interpretive rendition" in discussing popular orchestra
leaders.
Now let us rediscuss the Waring 40 and the Whiteman 4 '
cases. If the courts had recognized that the thing sought to
be protected was an arrangement, not an "artistic interpretation," then they would not have been misled into believing
that there was no statutory protection for the orchestra
leaders. They could, on the other hand, have pointed out to
them that such statutory rights existed and that their present
lack of legal remedy was due to their previous lack of diligence in taking the measures provided by law for their protection. The injunctions sought could well have been refused without any fear by the courts that justice had not
been done. The idea of a limited publication need not have
been raised. The court could have pointed out to the orchestra leaders the simplicity and certainty of this process
for protecting -their recordings against unauthorized uses.
The ultimate result could have been that a new and uncertain problem in the law was solved in terms of rules instead
of hazy standards. On the contrary, the result reached
through the faulty reasoning and lack of specialized musical
39

Protectionof the PerformingArtist's "Interpretative Rendition" through the

Arranger's Copyright. 37 III. L. Rev. 245 (1942-43).
4D Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937); Waring v. Dunlea, 26
F. Supp. 338 (D. C. E. D. N. C. 1939).
41 RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 2d 1940)
reversing 28 F. Supp. 787.
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knowledge of the courts has led to wrong conclusions and
uncertain principles.
Practice-Here is an unexplored field. In general the
relations between arranger and orchestra leader or arranger
and publisher are most casual. Ordinarily the arranger will
submit an arrangement for approval or disapproval. If it is
approved and used, the arranger will be paid a price for his
work and will promptly lose interest in any further developments. If the arrangement is uncommonly successful he
may momentarily chide himself for selling it so cheaply.
Likewise, the orchestra leader, when making a recording,
may do so under a simple royalty agreement whereby he receives a certain percentage of the record sales. He will not,
however, receive any income from the public performance of
this record for profit by broadcasting stations.
To help illustrate our point let us discuss the practice as
to popular songs. The song writer may be a member of the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, or
he may sell the song to a publisher who is a member.
This society is a unique organization which

".

. . is en-

gaged solely in issuing licenses for the non-dramatic public
performance for profit of the musical compositions of its
members, and distributes to them the net fees it collects from

'its licenses.

Its licensees consist principally of the owners

of hotels, cabarets, radio stations, motion picture theaters

and other places of amusement. Its work has grown from a
modest beginning in 1914 to a state where it now collects

several million dollars annually in fees from its licensees." 42
Its purposes are more formally set out in the Articles of Asso-

ciation."

The fees collected from licensed public perform-

ances are then distributed to members of the Society on the

basis of use of the members' compositions in the various
42 Broadcast Music, Inc. and Edward B. Marks Music Corporation v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 55 NYS 94 (1945).
43

ARTICLES

OF AssocIATIoN

AuTHORS AND PURaIsSHERs,

OF THE

AMRICAN

Article 1 (objects):

SOCIEY

OF

COMPOSERs,
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places of public amusement. Night clubs ordinarily pay. a
flat periodic fee for a blanket license to publicly perform
compositions of members of the Society. This license also
includes permission to use copyrighted arrangements. 4 The
license fee paid by broadcasting stations is based upon actual
logged use by the station. The great importance of these
functions of the Society to its members will be appreciated
when the impossibility of detection of infringements and collection of fees by the individual author, composer or publisher is considered.
Orchestra leaders are not ordinarily members of the Society, nor are arrangers." It is suggested that the inclusion
of these persons as members would operate to the benefit of
all. Such prolific "stock" arrangers as Johnny Warrington,
Section 1. We constitute ourselves a voluntary association under the name of
"American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers" for the following purposes, to-wit:
(a) To 1rotect composers, authors and publishers of musical works against
piracies of any kind;
(b) To promote reforms in the law respecting literary property;
(c) To procure uniformity and certainty in the law respecting literary property in all countries;
(d) To facilitate the administration of the copyright laws for the protection
of composers, authors and publishers of musical works;
(e) To abolish abuses and unfair practices and methods in connection with
the reproduction of musical works;
(f) To promote and foster by all lawful means the interest of composers,
authors and publishers of musical works;
(g) To grant licenses and collect royalties for the public performance of the
works of its members by instrumentalists, singers, mechanical instruments, radio
broadcasting, or any kind of combination of singers, instrumentalists and mechanical instruments, and to allot and distribute such royalties;
(h) To adjust and arbitrate differences and controversies between its members
and between its members and others, and to represent its members in controversies,
actions and proceedings involving the right of public performance of any work
of any member, or the question of authorship in any work of any member;
(i) To promote friendly intercourse and united action among composers, authors, publishers and producers of musical works;
(j) To etc.
(k) To etc.
(1) To do any and all other acts or things which may be found necessary or
convenient in carrying out any of the objects of the Society or in protecting or
furthering its interests or the interests of its members.
44
Communication from Mr. Herman Finkelstein, Resident Counsel of The
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
45 Ibid.
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Paul Weirich and Jack Mason may honestly claim a most
extensive use of their arrangements in places of public entertainment. Orchestra leaders, as members, could protect
themselves against damaging competition with their own recordings by employing the facilities of the Society to license
the public performance of their copyrighted arrangements,
as suggested in the section on utility of arrangement copyright, supra. This broadening of its activities would increase
the Society's usefulness to the music profession and help it
more completely to fulfill some of its declared objects.4 6
The public is daily growing more aware of the function
and importance of the arranger. The average well-informed'
person of today has at least heard of Eddie Sauter, Fletcher
Henderson, George Handy or Sy Oliver. The time may yet
come when some of the popular acclaim now accorded band
leaders will be directed toward the usually more deserving
arranger. At such time the law of arrangement copyright
may become an important field of law.
John H. Merryman

46 Attention should be called to the highly effective activities of The American Federation of Musicians in promoting the cause of its members and protecting
them from exploitation by the radio interests.

